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ARTICLES
Dismantling the Modern State?
The Changing Structural Foundations
of Federalism
By KEmTH E. WHITrINGTON*
I. Introduction
For most of the twentieth century, the United States has moved
toward increasing centralization of political power in the national gov-
ernment. Since the onset of the Great Depression, that centralization
has been relatively rapid. By the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court had
swept aside the remaining legal obstacles to centralization, thereby
formalizing a basic reconceptualization of federalism under the Con-
stitution that had been progressing for several years in a variety of
arenas. Many postwar scholars, after observing the changes wrought
by the trend toward centralization, began to argue for the replacement
of the "constitutional" concept of "dual federalism"' with a "prag-
matic" (functional) concept of intergovernmental relations that would
better cohere with twentieth century centralization. Thus, federalism,
as a constitutional concept, was largely abandoned, and centralization
was no longer regarded as requiring a legally based constitutional
explanation.
However, the economic, social, political, and ideological changes
of the late twentieth century suggest that the idea of federalism must
be revitalized. It is no longer clear whether the American political
system is committed to centralization. In fact, states increasingly play
an active and independent role in American government, and relative
decentralization is discussed as a realistic possibility. Such shifting
trends in federalism, between centralization and decentralization, sug-
* Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. The author thanks Tracey
Storey, Joe Mink, Rick Geddes, and Arthur Stinchcombe for their helpful comments.
1. The idea that the state and the federal governments operate in distinctly separate
spheres.
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gest that the Constitution is best understood as a dynamic political
instrument. Thus, predominate conceptions about the "constitu-
tional" structure of federalism need to be separated from the legal
doctrines of the nineteenth century and integrated into a political dy-
namic. Scholars recently have emphasized the concept of a "political
constitution"'2 that supplements the analytically dominant legal consti-
tution, arguing that "the Constitution is best understood as a text-
based institutional practice,"' 3 and as a consequence, "constitutional-
ism should be appreciated as a dynamic political and historical process
rather than as a static body of thought laid down in the eighteenth
century."4 Notwithstanding such suggestions, the idea of a fixed text
still hovers over constitutional discourse. As a result, it is assumed
that one cannot abandon the notion of "dual federalism" without
abandoning the constitutional significance of federalism entirely.5
The operation of the "political constitution," which structures
how political authority is distributed and exercised, is illustrated by
2. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); STEPHEN M. GRIFmN,
AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONALISM (1996); WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE
CONSTITUTION (1993); WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIHTs AND POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1996); WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOvERNMENT IN Tim UNITED
STATES (1908); Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 7
(1934).
3. GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 56.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Recognition of a "political constitution" reduces the Court's role in developing
constitutional meaning. Hence, if the constitutional framework develops initially through
the political process, rather than through litigation, constitutional meaning looks less di-
chotomous and judges appear more typically as "followers, not leaders, of constitutional
change." MOORE, supra note 2, at 12; see also id. at 3. In the case of federalism, the courts
have operated on the margins, often accommodating the dominant political tendencies in
federalism. Though the courts have sometimes formalized federal relations, they have
neither caused centralization nor established the political plausibility of decentralization.
GRImIN, supra note 2, at 68-87. As a result, judicial opinions may not be the best source
for studying the dynamics of American constitutional development, especially in relation
to structural features such as federalism.
Similarly, recent judicial interventions into federal relations have posed particular
problems for the "legal constitution" model, as scholars struggle to understand judicial
opinions that do not seem to articulate clear boundaries of permissible governmental ac-
tion or initiate sustained judicial enforcement of such boundaries. See, e.g., PHILIP BOB-
BITE, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 190-95 (1982); ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE 60-83 (1989); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL PoLrr-
ICAL PROCESS, 171-259 (1980). See generally Sanford Lakoff, Between Either/Or and More-
or-Less-Sovereignty Versus Autonomy Under Federalism, 24 PUBLrus 63 (1994). A more
direct examination of the operation of the "political constitution" may provide a better
understanding of constitutional development in this area, even if it does not provide rec-
ommendations for judicial action. Our goal is not to identify new constitutional "amend-
ments," but to understand the process and nature of constitutional transformations. Cf.
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 266-94.
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the transformations of the early and late twentieth century.6 In the
standard historical narrative, the federal system in the nineteenth cen-
tury "relied on a constitutional approach" embodied in the "set stan-
dards" of "dual federalism."7 Through most of the nineteenth
century, the states were the primary governing units in the United
States. The judiciary was occasionally called upon to prevent state
encroachment on the federal sphere, but political actors of all stripes
understood the basic constraints of the federal system, and there was
little political pressure to test those limits." During the New Deal,
those constitutional standards were subsequently "shredded," and the
"traditional constitutional era" was abandoned.9 The newly preferred
analytical approach of "intergovernmental relations" stripped federal-
ism of its formal and normative implications in order to focus on prag-
matic administrative adjustments within a single complex political
system. This conceptual transition abandoned the core contribution
of dual federalism: the idea that the state and national governments
occupied "separate spheres" and performed distinct governmental
functions.' 0 This new model emphasized cooperation between the na-
tional and state governments in providing an undifferentiated set of
common governmental services. Additionally, the transition rejected
any serious legal restraints on the activities of the national govern-
ment based on centralization concerns. The federal government no
longer stood for limited and delegated powers. Instead, it represented
plenary powers constrained only by specified individual rights. Fi-
nally, the administrative minutiae of intergovernmental relations oc-
curred against a backdrop of centralization. The passing of dual
6. Such transformations were not unexpected by the founders. As David Epstein
summarized Alexander Hamilton:
Thus the relative spheres of the central and state governments will depend on the
relative attachment of the people, which may be expected to change in the fu-
ture .... [T]he partition between state and nation will not be as much a legal
issue as a political one .... Parchment can neither limit the nation's powers, nor
assure them against encroachment. Two governments competing for the people's
support form a structure more useful than fixed rules.
DAviD F. EPSTEIN, THm POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 53 (1984).
7. John Shannon & James Edwin Kee, The Rise of Competitive Federalism, 9 PuB.
BUDGETING & FIN. 5, 5 (1989).
8. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 96-111 (1941);
ROBERT G. McCLosKEY, THE AMERiCAN SUPREME COURT 119-26 (1994); CARL B.
SWISHER, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 965-68, 1018-19 (1943).
9. Shannon & Kee, supra note 7, at 6.
10. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 1-2, 22-
23 (1950).
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federalism led to an actual practice of centralization and not just a
mere loosening of potential restraints upon the federal government."
Modern analysis tends to obscure the contingent events necessary
to centralization and suggests a natural irreversible evolution.' 2 If the
simple narrative, that a long period of constitutional federalism was
followed by a sharp break and the collapse of federalism, is rejected,
then distinct historical eras become evident, with their own organiza-
tional imperatives and patterns of political authority. We do not live
in a post-constitutional world; we simply live in a world that is differ-
ently constituted. The question, then, is what motivates political ac-
tors to organize American government into these relatively stable
patterns?
The founders "intended structure to protect and implement cer-
tain substantive outcomes."'' 3  Notably, constitutional structures
helped to protect established systems of property. It is not insignifi-
cant that dual federalism gave way at the same time that lawyers and
politicians lost faith in the sanctity of the old property regime. 4 But
when federalism is seen as evolving in response to changing substan-
tive commitments, rather than simply collapsing when the old commit-
ments were abandoned, the concept of constitutionalism once again
remains relevant in the context of federalism. Political actors struggle
to interpret and define the significance of social and economic
11. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 537-47
(1985), the Court embraced the view that abandonment of dual federalism drains the con-
stitutional significance from federal-state relations. Justice Blackmun, by noting that a
clear division between state and federal functions is elusive, suggested that the state and
federal governments engage in a constantly changing and overlapping set of functions. See
id. at 548. Therefore, he doubted "that courts ultimately can identify principled constitu-
tional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty." Id. Blackmun's doubt came
in part because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for "fundamental" elements of state
sovereignty. See id.; see also Richard P. Nathan, Federalism - The Great "Composition," in
THE NEw AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, 231, 245-50 (Anthony King ed., 1990); Andrzej
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia,
1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 346-59. See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Feder-
alism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994). Although the
Court in Garcia recognized that states have "interests," it did not recognize that those
interests occupy any special constitutional status. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. The two
governments no longer occupied distinct and separate spheres; they simply conformed to
the shifting demands of national public opinion.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT HIGGS, Cusis AND LEvIATHAN 57-74 (1987); Samuel H. Beer,
The Modernization of American Federalism, 3 PuBLIus 49, 50 (1973).
13. Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTs OF BELIEF 178
(1996).
14. See BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 47-195 (1993); How-
ARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 101-93 (1998).
changes that ultimately redistribute authority and material resources.
Ideology and culture are as important as objective conditions to the
eventual reconstitution of the political world brought about by social
and economic change.'i However, explaining constitutional changes
in American federalism in terms of political responses to changing val-
ues requires identifying shifts in the underlying political structures
that are responsible for movements such as centralization.
Centralization was not merely fostered by the nationalization of
the economy in the late nineteenth century. Instead, it arose from the
particular form of that nationalization and the political responses to it.
Thus, the key to centralization lies not in economic modernization and
nationalization per se, but in the philosophy behind the governmental
activism that accompanied it. Centralization was not predetermined
by structural economic changes, but arose from the sociopolitical un-
derstanding of those changes. Constitutional structures are not simply
functionalist; the linkages between economic and political arrange-
ments are not so predetermined. Rather, the public understanding
and reaction to economic change is a key site of political struggle.
Constitutional meaning and structure is ultimately responsive to en-
during shifts in political values and the socioeconomic environment.
Changes in federalism depend not on the recovery of previously lost
constitutional meanings, but on a reconfiguration of the substantive
foundations upon which constitutional structures depend. A complete
explanation for shifts in federalism must integrate the mechanisms by
which economic, cultural, and ideological forces are translated into
political action. 6 Nonetheless, an important first step is to recognize
the relationship between social foundations and constitutional
structures.
Centralization arose through a desire to control the economic and
ideological transformations of the early twentieth century, necessitat-
ing a new emphasis on regulatory, redistributive, and national security
functions that the state governments could no longer adequately ful-
fill. 17 But as those governmental functions begin to recede in impor-
15. See, e.g., GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS 1-21 (1994); JAMES LIVINGSTON,
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 33-67 (1986); MARTIN J. SK.AR, THE CoRpo-
RATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 1-85, 431-32 (1988).
16. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1520-59
(1994).
17. Thus, we need to examine how markets and market ideology help preserve feder-
alism, as well as how federal structures help preserve markets. Cf. Barry R. Weingast, The
Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic De-
velopment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
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tance, at least as vehicles of economic control, the value and reality of
centralization is likewise reduced. States and localities become more
important in the American system of government because of their
ability to respond to the primary political concerns of the period,
rather than because of a forced devolution of functions.
Although the states have always retained their formal indepen-
dence from the central government, their ability to influence political
issues and their capacity to take independent action have varied over
time. The relative centralization of federalism moves along such ob-
servable lines. This paper examines the structural foundations of this
movement toward centralization that has defined twentieth century
American federalism." This paper also considers some of the modern
countertrends to that movement which have fostered a move toward
decentralization. Considering the interaction between several long-
term political variables over the course of the twentieth century sheds
light on how particular political actions can build up an interlocking
architecture for political life, facilitating and constraining individual
political decisions. Long-term transformations in the objective condi-
tions of the economy, the social and political understanding of those
conditions, and dominant political ideologies have significant implica-
tions for the trajectory of federalism.
Section two examines the basic precedents and transitions in
function and attitude that pushed the political system toward greater
centralization. Specifically, it examines the relationships among Pro-
gressivism's administrative ethic, the rise of the positive state, and
shifts in public morality in order to explain the centralization of the
federal structure. Section three suggests how those foundations of the
modern state have changed and examines the trajectory of decentrali-
zation that is being set by the decline of liberalism, the rise of the
entrepreneurial state, and shifts in the public morality. Section four
highlights some countertrends to decentralization and draws out some
implications of this analysis for understanding the future direction of
federalism and the nature of constitutional change.
18. See generally Beer, supra note 12; John E. Chubb, Federalism and the Bias of Cen-
tralization, in THE NEw DIRECTION IN AMERICAN PoLrcs 273 (John E. Chubb & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1985); Daniel J. Elazar, Opening the Third Century of American Federalism:
Issues and Prospects, 509 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 11, 13 (1990); John Kin-
caid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 A,'imLs AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI.
139 (1990).
DISMANTLING THE MODERN STATE?
H. The Logic of the Modern State
The "modem state," as it exists within the United States, is not a
natural entity or a separate and inert superstructure detached from
society or politics. Instead, it results from a particular interaction of
political movements and events. It is more than an arena within which
politics take place; politics constitute the modem state. The state ex-
presses itself through and by the repetitive activity of political life.19
As a result, the conglomeration of ideals, interests, and institutions
that form the modem state have a distinct fundamental logic that can
be analyzed and understood. For example, the specific logic of the
modem state in early twentieth century America favored centraliza-
tion of political authority and influence. Thus, the logic of the modem
state reshaped the existing meaning of federalism within broad consti-
tutional confines, creating a political system not inherent in the consti-
tutional design but tolerated by it.20 An analysis of early twentieth
century centralization serves a dual purpose: first, it illustrates how
basic elements of the Constitution are reconceptualized in a political
context; and second, it provides a historical perspective on more re-
cent political tendencies.
Centralization was marked by the judiciary's retreat from the en-
forcement of dual federalism in the face of the cataclysms of the Great
Depression and World War II.21 This legal accommodation alone,
however, does not explain the underlying political constitution of the
postwar era. Why was centralization not just an intermittent feature
of American politics after the judicial deregulation of federalism, but
instead an overwhelming tendency of the new political system? The
structural foundations for centralization had roots in both the early
decades of the twentieth century and the postwar years. Much of the
actual growth of the central government, vis-a-vis the states, occurred
through the "low politics" of mid-century governmental activism, but
the normal politics of centralization depended on a prior reconstitu-
tion of political understandings that established the precedents, re-
sources, and legitimacy for such later activity.22 Although it is
19. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SocErTY 1-40 (1984).
20. I set aside for present purposes an examination of just how well post-New Deal
developments could be "tolerated" by the Founders' Constitution. Even if the old consti-
tutional system was broken, and not just bent, in the twentieth century, it does not follow
that a new constitutional system did not take its place.
21. See CUsHmAN, supra note 14, at 141-225. See generally Corwin, supra note 10.
22. John E. Chubb, The Constitution, Institutionalization, and the Evolution of Federal-
ism, in THE CONSTITUTION AN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 262, 264-67 (Peter
F. Nardulli ed., 1992).
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impossible to know how American federalism would have developed
in the absence of the crises of the 1930s and 1940s, many of the seeds
for those developments had been planted even earlier. This section is
concerned with identifying those enduring forces-the administrative
ethic, the positive state, and shifts in public morality-that pushed the
political system toward centralization through most of the twentieth
century.
A. The Administrative Ethic
The administrative ethic, absorbed by the Progressive movement,
became a crucial element in the construction of the modern state.' It
provided the framework for the development of the new state appara-
tus and legitimated a vision of the new governing order. It also helped
define what government should do and how it should accomplish its
goals. In the process, the administrative ethic created a powerful cen-
tralizing bias.
A primary component of the administrative ethic was the exper-
tise model.24 Changing social and economic conditions of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided an opportunity for
the conceptualization of expertise, recognized and exploited by a pro-
fessional elite through their own organization and mobilization. 
5
Moreover, this new class of professionals was particularly open to
centralization.
Increasingly, improvements in transportation and communica-
tions technology linked remote outposts to the nation's center,
thereby bringing previously isolated "island communities" into a na-
tional market.26 This interdependence also brought complexity, un-
dermined traditional and observable relationships, and replaced them
with an apparently loose web of interdependent connections. The
complexity of society was mirrored in the business sphere and magni-
fied by rapid advances in the natural sciences. 27 Experts were re-
23. See SAMUEL P. HAYES, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 261-76
(1969); GEORGE E. MowRy, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE BIRTH OF
MODERN AMERICA 20-104 (1958); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-
1920, at 164-95 (1967).
24. See WIEBE, supra note 23, at 111-32. See generally Magali Sarfatti Larson, The
Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power, in THE AuTHoRrrY OF EX-
PERTS 28 (Thomas L. Haskell ed., 1984).
25. See THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
24-47 (1977). See generally Larson, supra note 24.
26. WIEBE, supra note 23, at 11-75.
27. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND (1977); DAVID F.
NOBLE, AMERICA By DESIGN (1977); Louis Galambos, The American Economy and the
quired both to operate the new corporations and to address their
various external effects. The local elite of generalists gave way to a
new cadre of formally educated specialists. These professionals un-
derstood society and the economy less by their local effects than by
their central logic.28 Professional standards, promulgated by new na-
tional organizations, served to separate the "true" experts from "ama-
teurs" and generalists.2 9 Equally important, professionalization
oriented knowledgeable experts toward their own national commu-
nity. Their authority and interests were not tied to local employers or
neighbors, but to an association of similarly situated experts. If
knowledge itself was fragmented through specialization, experts were
merely dispersed.3"
Expertise was put into practice through scientific management,
which required the centralized direction and planning of production,
corporations, and ultimately society. Knowledge and decisions were
transferred from the masses to a limited number of specialists.
Taylorite control over the bodily movements and psychology of work-
ers was supplemented by the rationalization of the manufacturing pro-
cess.3 ' As engineers expanded their attention from natural to human
resources, so economists and social scientists sought to rationalize so-
cial relations more broadly. The proliferation of professional associa-
tions in the late nineteenth century was driven by reformers who
hoped to provide "intelligent leadership and social order. ' 32 The ex-
pansion and refinement of knowledge gradually allowed replacement
of the "invisible hand" with the visible. Both the process and sub-
stance of expertise underlay the administrative ethic, and as the body
Reorganization of the Sources of Knowledge, in THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN
MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 269 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979).
28. See WIEBE, supra note 23, at 111-63. See generally HAsKELL, supra note 25; Lar-
son, supra note 24; John Higham, The Matrix of Specialization, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 3 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979).
29. HASKELL, supra note 25, at 63-89. See generally Larson, supra note 24.
30. See generally HASKELL, supra note 25; Beer, supra note 12, at 74-87; Louis
Galambos, Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the
Organizational Synthesis, 57 Bus. HIST. REv. 471 (1979); Dorothy Ross, The Development
of the Social Sciences, in THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA,
1860-1920, at 107 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979).
31. See generally HARRY BRAvERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPIrAL 45-249
(1974); SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT (1964); NOBLE, supra note 27; ROBERT
B. REICH, THE NXr AMERICAN FRONTIER 47-114 (1983); CHARLEs F. SABEL, WORK AND
POLITICS (1982); ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA 38-100
(1982).
32. Ross, supra note 30, at 112.
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of knowledge was centralized and codified, a greater understanding of
society allowed a greater control over it.
A related element of the administrative ethic was the elevation of
the ideal of "neutrality." Neutrality left no place for partisan interests
in the administration of government, and that commitment inevitably
encroached on policy-making. Where party government called for the
democratic administration of government in the interest of the electo-
ral victors, the administrative ethic insisted on impartial rule by ex-
perts in accord with objective principles of social order. This shift in
governmental ethos led to the replacement of locally rooted party
regulars with nationally oriented experts, rooting out decentralizing
ties and commitments as well as inefficiency and corruption.33 Ad-
ministration was to be separated from politics, and policy-making was
to be reconfigured in accord with the new professional standards.
Thus, the government was entrusted to serve the "public good," not
the interests of political victors.
The bureaucracy became the institutional embodiment of the ad-
ministrative ethic. It emerged initially in private corporations in their
attempt to deal with their unprecedented scope and depth of opera-
tions. Reformist professionals refined this model in order to establish
this bureaucratic form within government. 4 Bureaucracy promised to
rationalize governmental operations by replacing the ad hoc decision-
making of generalist politicians and political appointees with coherent
administration in accord with pre-established rules and objective sci-
entific findings.35 A unified, hierarchical, and efficient bureaucratic
structure would replace the overlapping and ineffective political
structure.
Compared to developments in other countries, the actual
achievement of American reformers was relatively modest. The ex-
isting constitutional structure fractured and limited reform efforts. 6
Nevertheless, the transformation was substantial. American policy-
33. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEw AMERICAN STATE 47-84, 177-211,
248-84 (1982); Brian Balogh, Reorganizing the Organizational Synthesis: Federal-Profes-
sional Relations in Modern America, 5 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
119 (1991); Beer supra note 12, at 74-80. See generally Ross, supra note 30.
34. See MARTIN SHEFrER, POLITICAL PARTIEs AND THE STATE 61-97 (1994).
35. This vision applied at the constitutional level as well, where inter-branch conflict
was now the aberration to be replaced with presidentially led administration. See JOHN A.
ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION 59-75 (1986); JEFFREY K. TuLIs, THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENcY 117-32 (1987).
36. See generally Theda Skocpol, The Origins of Social Policy in the United States: A
Polity-Centered Analysis, in THE DYNAMICs OF AMERICAN POLITICS 182 (Lawrence C.
Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1994).
making was often more centralized than formal administration, with
Congress actively intervening in "local" policies from social welfare to
education. Local administration, moreover, was often greatly influ-
enced by ties to the national bureaucracy, which shaped everything
from policy priorities to work habits. 7
The creation of a governmental bureaucracy also served the new
functions of twentieth century government. The nineteenth century
government readily featured Congress when the primary political de-
cisions were either allocative, such as tariffs or internal improvements,
or structural, such as the establishment of a national bankruptcy law
or the definition of monetary units. Yet, once the federal government
became more involved in regulating a complex economy, reflecting
the centralizing tendencies outlined below, the government needed
mechanisms for monitoring economic activity and intervening at will.
Theodore Roosevelt was emblematic in his assessment of legislative
government, lamenting that "all modern legislative bodies tend to
show their incapacity to meet the new and complex needs of the
time."38 Railroad economists, for example, were active in shaping the
political decision to regulate railroad rates-which, in turn, required
the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
staffed with economists-rather than to prohibit identified practices
or to break up some companies legislatively.39 Decisions previously
made within the railroads' own centralized corporate bureaucracies
were now, through federal regulation, being further centralized and
made within the national government's ICC.
The significance of the administrative ethic was not merely in ad-
vancing the self-interest of a rising professional class but, more impor-
tantly, in shaping the dominant conception of what was in the public
interest and how to accomplish it. Bureaucracy and centralization be-
came the appropriate responses to socioeconomic complaints. The
cultural and intellectual dominance of the administrative ethic
prefigured the political response to later crises and social problems.
B. The Positive State
The decades following the turn of the century witnessed the rise
of new social pressures and a new public philosophy of activist liber-
37. See Chubb, supra note 18, at 294; Martha Derthick, American Federalism:
Madison's Middle Ground in the 1980s, 47 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 66, 67-70 (1987).
38. SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914, at 115 (2d ed.
1995).
39. See BERK, supra note 15, at 75-115, 153-70; SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 121-62,
248-84.
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alism that required expanding the scope of governmental functions.
The new modem state emphasized a commitment to regulatory and
redistributive functions. Moreover, as the example of the ICC illus-
trates, the administrative ethic, with its focus on technocratic exper-
tise, easily fits within the regulatory and redistributive model.4" The
rise of the federal regulatory scheme established the essential central-
izing logic of the modern, positive state at the turn of the century, but
an increasing commitment to the political redistribution of wealth sup-
plemented and intensified those centralizing pressures.4' Ultimately,
the goals of the positive state were inconsistent with the constraints of
decentralized federalism. The shift in emphasis among governmental
functions allowed national growth at the expense of the states.
The rise of modem federal regulation was a political response to
fundamental social and economic changes in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, especially developments in the corporate
form. Early corporations were either used to serve as public utilities
or kept small in order to be regulated by normal market forces. By
the late nineteenth century, the status of corporations had dramati-
cally changed. With the special privilege of legislative charter routin-
ized and delegated, corporations rapidly proliferated and the effective
abandonment of restrictions on corporate purposes began.42 Most
corporations engaged in for-profit manufacturing or commerce, rather
than providing public goods. Judicial rulings construed corporations
as unitary entities and their charters as private property, integrating
those enterprises into the general society and economy and distancing
them from both government and creditors. Corporations swiftly be-
came the dominant independent and private organizational form.43
As the legal status of corporations changed, so did their economic
status. Corporations did not merely replace previous business organi-
zational forms; rather, they transformed the nature of the market
within which businesses operated. Although corporations had several
advantages over alternative forms of business organization, they were
especially favored for their, ability to replace market forces with ad-
40. See generally Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies,
and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677 (1964).
41. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
42. See MORTON J. HORwrrz, TiH TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 107-39 (1977); JAMES WILLIARD HURST, TmE LEGrTMACY OF T= BusiNnss CORPORA-
TION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 13-57 (1970).
43. See MORTON J. HoRWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960,
at 65-108 (1992); HURST, supra note 42, at 13-57; SKLAR, supra note 15, at 43-175. See
generally TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND Busi-
NESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, Vol. 1 (Glen Porter ed., 1979).
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ministrative control mechanisms for coordinating economic activity."
Moreover, new multistate corporations advanced the nationalization
of business in America. The multistate operations of private corpora-
tions weakened the capacity of individual states to control their inter-
nal economies. Driven in part by contingent political and economic
decisions, the nationalization of businesses furthered the consolida-
tion of the economy and society as a whole. 45 Local economies were
subsumed in the periphery of a national economy, with only a handful
of urban centers remaining. The decentralization of both market
processes and geography was replaced with relatively hierarchical cor-
porate management.
The growth of corporations contributed to a deepening fear that
the market process itself, as traditionally understood, was no longer
sustainable in the face of chronic overproduction.46 For many corpo-
rate managers, the model of market competition that had acted in
classical terms as an invisible hand to produce economic equilibrium
was now imposing wild uncertainty on producers and creating a secu-
lar trend toward economic ruin. Modem productive capacity ap-
peared to overwhelm the market mechanisms to allocate resources.47
If the short-term problem was an excess of competition, the long-term
solution was the end of competition. Eventually production could be
controlled and prices stabilized only by consolidating the market in
the hands of a few national corporations.48
The alternative was to replace the free market system with inter-
nal corporate management, or at least managed competition.49 The
inevitability of this transformation was culturally and intellectually
pervasive through much of the twentieth century. 0 The crucial task
was to determine when free market regulation would have to be re-
44. See EDWARD CHASE KIRKLAND, DREAM AND THOUGHT IN THE BusNmEss COM-
muNnr, 1860-1900, at 9-27 (1964); SKLAR, supra note 15, at 1-30; TRACHTENBERG, supra
note 31, at 70-100.
45. See BER.K, supra note 15, at 47-72; TRACHTENBERG, supra note 31, at 57-60, 84-86,
111-30; WIEBE, supra note 23, at 17-27; HAYs, supra note 38, at 4-17.
46. See SKLAR, supra note 15, at 43-175.
47. See id. at 53-68.
48. See id. at 72-92, 154-77.
49. See id. at 154-73; see also MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE UNITED STATES AS A DEVELOP-
ING CotrRY 71-77 (1992); LIVINGSTON, supra note 15, at 49-67.
50. See generally EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD 2000-1887 (1917);
ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1934); JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1960); JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1950); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF
BusE-lss ENTERPRISE (1932).
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placed with political control and when free market controls merely
needed to be supplemented by political mechanisms. In either case,
however, the corporations seemed to pose the risk that they could
step out of the fetters of the market entirely given the assumptions
that they could control production, set prices, and eliminate competi-
tion. Order had to be reimposed by political means.
The regulatory logic of the corporate era used positive govern-
mental action to fill the gaps of apparent market failure. The develop-
ing regulatory logic entailed centralizing in two respects. First, it
substituted the centralized administration of political controls for the
decentralized coordination of market mechanisms. 5' That process was
already well underway in the economic realm itself, as corporations
absorbed market mechanisms and put internal management in their
place. Governmental regulation of corporate practices ranging from
the prices of products to the working conditions of labor would merely
cap these developments and insure public, rather than private, control
over economic administration. Second, the regulatory logic pushed
forward the nationalization of governmental control over the econ-
omy. 2 Of course, the process was never intended to be and never was
complete; but the regulatory logic established the underlying trajec-
tory of federalism, pushing it toward greater centralization of author-
ity in the national government. The point is not that the states were
inactive, or that state governments were rarely the first targets of early
reformers, but that the activism of modern liberalism created political
incentives to centralize-first gradually and then rapidly during the
crisis of the Great Depression.
Several factors built nationalization into the modern state's dy-
namic. One factor was the need to end competition among states.
Political competition among states, like market competition, was in-
creasingly seen as dysfunctional. Such competition among the states
undermined reformers' efforts to develop the positive state. Certain
governmental activities were too difficult to establish and maintain if
state governments were in competition. For example, individual states
found it difficult to impose costly regulations on mobile businesses,
such as minimum wages, higher taxes, and prohibitions on child labor.
Hence, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,s3 the Supreme Court recognized the
force of this argument, even as it struck down direct federal prohibi-
51. See CusHmAN, supra note 14, at 45-105; LIViNGSTON, supra note 15, at 129-212;
SKLAR, supra note 15, at 179-430.
52. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
53. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
tions on the interstate shipments of goods manufactured using child
labor. 4 Those states that tolerated child labor gained "an economic
advantage over others," and such "unfair competition" made uniform
laws desirable.5 By characterizing such state competition in labor
policies as intrinsically "unfair," however, the Court accepted the logic
of the reformist position. States similarly were hesitant to pursue ex-
pansive redistributive policies given the mobility of residents. Fear of
becoming "welfare magnets" stifled reform efforts from the turn of
the century. Although many such reforms were nonetheless locally
adopted, the logic of the positive state ran against the continued state
competition occasioned by decentralized federalism. 6 For the advo-
cates of an activist liberal state, regulatory and redistributive policies
needed to be nationalized in order to be politically and substantively
effective. 7 Once such reforms were accepted as not only legitimate
but also economically "required," there would be little support for
maintaining decentralized federalism.
Reforms also encouraged centralization because of their need for
greater state capacity, especially the enhanced fiscal and administra-
tive resources needed to effectuate such interventionist policies.58 The
size and scope of modern corporations and the redistributive goals of
reformers taxed traditional state capacities. Despite some local Pro-
gressive successes, throughout much of the twentieth century, state
governments were widely regarded as incompetent, with limited ad-
ministrative expertise and few fiscal resources to accomplish reform.5 9
The potential but largely untapped power of the federal government
offered an alternative to state inaction. The national fiscal state
54. See id. at 273, 275.
55. Id.
56. The reasons for the success of particular reforms were varied, ranging from public
pressure that overcame business concerns to the desire of politically powerful business
interests to impose costs on rivals. Nonetheless, the states were "laboratories of democ-
racy" precisely in the sense that they were the sites for small-scale experiments for reforms
that could be nationalized if deemed successful.
57. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CrrY LIMrrs 3-92 (1981); JAMES WEINsTEIN, THE CoRo-
RATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918, at 30-32 (1968); William Graebner, Feder-
alism in the Progressive Era: A Structural Interpretation of Reform, 64 J. AM. HIST. 331,
352-53 (1977). See generally PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. RoM, WELFARE MAGNETS
(1990); David Brian Robertson, The Bias of American Federalism: The Limits of Welfare-
State Development in the Progressive Era, 1 J. OF POL'Y. HIST. 261 (1989).
58. See Beer, supra note 12, at 74-87; see also ALICE M. RIvLIN, REVIVING THE AMER-
ICAN DREAM 87-91 (1992).
59. See JAMEs BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 474-506 (1995); HERBERT
CROLY, THE PROMIsE OF AMERICAN LwE 317-28 (1965); Samuel P. Hays, Political Parties
and the Community-Society Continuum, in THE AMERIcAN PARTY SYSTEMS 152, 152-81
(Chambers & Burnham eds., 1967). See generally WEINsTEN, supra note 57.
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opened possibilities for income redistribution and governmental
projects beyond the reach of a more decentralized governmental sys-
tem.6" From 1930 to 1960, total governmental revenues remained flat,
but federal revenues quadrupled as a percent of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), and federal spending rose from a quarter of all gov-
ernmental spending to nearly two-thirds.6' Moreover, the federal gov-
ermnent had administrative resources that were not readily available
to the states. The federal administrative state, although uncoordi-
nated and slow in its development, mustered expertise and institu-
tional resources that exceeded those of the states and the largest
corporations.62 Federal civilian employment increased six-fold be-
tween 1881 and 1930, and quadrupled again by 1960.63 As American
government increasingly engaged in new kinds of activities, the cen-
tral government provided a relative advantage as opposed to individ-
ual states. 4
New corporate managers had their own reasons to support cen-
tralization during this period. For corporations and supporters of the
new nationalized economy, federal action was a source of uniformity
in economic regulation when state efforts to provide uniformity
proved ineffective.65 Interjurisdictional differences, no longer viewed
as nurturing local industry, seemed to be a hindrance to the efficiency
of national industry.66 Additionally, the political autonomy of the
states threatened the reformist accommodation to the new corporate
order. Nationalizing fundamental decisions about how to structure
60. See Elliot W. Brownlee, Tax Regimes, National Crisis, and State-Building in
America, in FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE 1941-1995, at 37, 69-97 (W. Elliot
Brownlee ed., 1996).
61. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET [OMB], HIsT. TABLES, BUDGET OF
THE U.S. Gov'T, FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 16,21 (1997); see also THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 36-38 (1990).
62. See ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE 297-408 (1991); HIGGS, supra note
12, at 20-30; BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE 5 (1983); Beer, supra note 12, at 74-86.
63. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-78 (Part 2), at 1102-03 (1975).
64. The continual military activities of War World II and the Cold War gave further
impetus to these centralized state-building activities. War is a premier activity of the cen-
tral government and justifies a larger claim on social resources on its part. Moreover,
militarism has tended to expand central governmental activity into traditionally local areas,
from industrial production, to road construction, to education. See JOHN D. DONAHUE,
DISUNITED STATES 26-27 (1997); GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 81-86; ALFRED M. KELLY, ET
AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 572-601, 663-81 (1983); Balogh, supra note 33, at 154-
66. A continuing preoccupation with national security heightened the relative importance
of the central government.
65. See Graebner, supra note 57, at 347-55.
66. See HURST, supra note 42, at 69-74, 146-51; Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the
American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 L. & Soc. REv. 57, 118, 97-99, 113-16 (1975).
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and regulate the economy avoided and disempowered populist
strongholds and socialist threats in state legislatures.67 The range of
acceptable political options could be effectively narrowed by centraliz-
ing the decision-making forum to one where those who agreed on ba-
sic premises were dominant.68
The economic and political situation of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries paralleled the logic of activist liberalism, or
at least seemed to make it possible. This period was marked by an
expanding and deepening industrialization. Unlike state boundaries,
national boundaries were not readily permeable to corporate flight
and worker migration. Technical and administrative limitations, as
well as heavy prior investments, kept firms within the United States.
Centralization of governmental regulation in the national government
was sufficient to contain the heavy industry of the early twentieth cen-
tury.69 The structure of those industries and evolving political and so-
cial arrangements also fostered the development of a theory of
"counterbalancing power," or "interest group pluralism."7 The mod-
ern state, dedicated to the regulation of large corporations and the
redistribution of national income, could readily identify and mobilize
the relevant social groups that were needed to support governmental
policy. Although diverging in many particulars, the leadership of such
groups shared a basic agreement about the desired future of the
American economy and society that emphasized social stability and a
corporate economy. As a result, negotiations among those leaders,
facilitated by governmental officials, could lead to viable compromises
on policy. The stability of centralized social structures facilitated cen-
tralized policy-making by a national elite.71
Thus, centralization naturally coincided with the rise of the posi-
tive state. It was consistent with the dominant theories explaining the
67. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 5-6, 159-64,279-80 (1963).
68. See E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 78-96 (1960).
69. This economic situation is historically specific, not universal. Prior to the late nine-
teenth century, firms were largely local and could be contained by sub-national govern-
ments exercising regulatory and redistributive powers. Even in the early twentieth
century, the effect was not uniform. See STEPHEN P. ERIE, RAINBOw's END 254-58 (1988);
PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REvISrrED 17-112 (1995).
70. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 108-53 (1956); THEODORE J.
LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 55-99 (1979).
71. See GALBRAITH, supra note 70, at 108-53; Lowi, supra note 70, at 55-123; SKLAR,
supra note 15, at 179-332; WEINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 3-39. Such efforts at policy-making
were not always successful-the relevant players could be fragmented. When agreement
at this level broke down, policy-making itself was brought to a halt. See ELLIS W. HAwLEY,
THE NEw DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 6-7 (1966); KENNETH FINEGOLD &
THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA'S NEW DEAL 90-113, 161-65 (1995).
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workings of the modem corporate economy. Centralization also pro-
vided the best model for accomplishing newly important governmen-
tal functions and underscored the dominant ideology of modem
liberalism. Given an expanding political commitment to controlling
social forces, the national government presented the best vehicle for
successfully exercising such control.
C. The Public Morality
Centralization was bolstered not only by shifting economic com-
mitments and their ideological foundations, but also by a shifting pub-
lic morality. As a result of public debate over appropriate ideals, the
modification and mobilization of cultural norms, and the development
of a new understanding of public administration, reformers fashioned
a new public philosophy that required rethinking the way government
operates and the nature of its responsibilities.72 States lost much of
their moral authority as representatives of the people, and popular
allegiance shifted to the national government.73 The states also lost
public confidence in their ability to function as independent polities
within a federal system. In the context of the judicial deregulation of
federal boundaries, the public's lack of faith in state governments had
significant ramifications for their political influence.
The first wave of moral reconsideration of federalism can be des-
ignated as Progressive-era morality. Ironically, the significance of this
movement rested on the very dominance of the states as governing
institutions in the nineteenth century. The states, the political units
most responsible for public well-being, suffered the consequences of
public disillusionment with the existing governing structure. Muck-
raking journalism called attention to state policy failures, corruption
and the unpleasantness of early industrialism, subnational politics, and
local political machines.74 Although the federal government suffered
its own scandals, the states and localities bore the brunt of the new
journalistic and reformist attention.75
The exposure of government and business practices focused not
only on corruption and bad faith, but also on the limitations of inher-
72. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
74. See HAYS, supra note 38, at 92-94; RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THi AGE OF REFORM
185-212 (1955); TRAcrNBERG, supra note 31, at 161-62.
75. For example, public exposds of federal corruption were a basic part of the cam-
paign for civil service reform. See SKOwRoNEK, supra note 33, at 47-83, 177-210.
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ited political forms.76 Economic and social modernization was out-
stripping the capacity of states to respond adequately to new
corresponding social needs. Such concerns led to numerous reforms
in state and local governments, such as the building-up of administra-
tive capacity, the establishment of the civil service, and the adoption
of secret ballots.77 Nonetheless, these reforms were often piecemeal
and rarely had the full effect that was originally expected of them.
Replacing party machines with expert administrators did not have a
clearly democratizing effect on urban politics; further, cities and states
still suffered from limited fiscal resources and a tenuous hold on the
national economy. Even with reforms, states were still conceived of as
backwards, dominated by parochial concerns, and incapable of ad-
dressing the larger problems of the national economy.78
The apparent failure of the states was particularly significant
given the expanded role of government advocated by modern liberal
reformers. While earlier observers were willing to tolerate political
failures as inevitable or unimportant, modern reformers found state
disabilities to be a major obstacle to achieving their substantive
goals.79 State and local governments hardly ceased to be important in
practical terms, but future initiatives devolved increasingly to the na-
tional government. Social progress was to be achieved by circum-
venting states, not by working with them. This gradual frustration
with state parochialism, though already firmly established, was greatly
accelerated by the crisis of the Great Depression.
The second wave of moral reconsideration of the states' role in a
federal system came with the civil rights movement of the 1950s and
1960s. During this period, federalism was increasingly associated with
the inadequacy of the state governments and the moral bankruptcy of
the states.8 0 The focus of the civil rights movement on de jure segre-
gation highlighted the racial policies of the South as a particular re-
gional problem. State governments were integral to Southern racism,
which made racism a political problem requiring political reform,
rather than a social problem requiring moral suasion and civic
education.
76. See HAYS, supra note 38, at 89-93; HOFSTADTER, supra note 74, at 186-219;
SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 177-210.
77. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 317-42 (1977).
78. See TERRY SAFORD, STORM OVER THm STATES 17-38 (1967).
79. See CROLY, supra note 59, at 317-56.
80. See MORTON GRODZiNS, Tim AMERIcAN SYSTEM 290-306 (1966); SANFORD, supra
note 78, at 1-8. See generally BURKE MARHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIrviL RIGHTS (1964);
WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM (1964).
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Furthermore, the defense of Jim Crow laws relied on the ex-
ploitation of the federal structure. State representatives in the U.S.
Senate and state governmental institutions were mobilized to resist
national efforts to vindicate civil rights. Opponents of civil rights re-
forms explicitly defended their position with states' rights arguments.
Images of Southern governors barring blacks from access to schools
and Southern police beating black protesters changed the social per-
ception, understanding, and value of federalism. As a result, civil
rights were effectively equated with centralization, such that political
scientist William Riker could conclude: "if in the United States, one
disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism."'" Only
the centralization of political power in the national government was
perceived as an appropriate response for resolving racial antagonisms
and overcoming local opposition to reform. The civil rights crisis of
the 1950s and 1960s was understood as the consequence of a failure to
centralize power in the 1870s. s2
Race-related civil rights were only the most dramatic instance of
the postwar expansion of notions of individual rights, and the states
found themselves on the losing side of that historic transition. The
Warren Court's judicial activism came into its own with the applica-
tion of new individual rights doctrines against the states in areas such
as race relations, religious establishment, police conduct, and sexual
behavior.83 The states and decentralized federalism were represented
as at best impotent and at worse malevolent. From the earliest opin-
ion polls of the late 1930s to those of the late 1960s, public attitudes
showed strong support for giving more power to the federal govern-
ment and showed relatively greater trust in federal government than
in the state or local governments.8 4 The identification of federalism
with civil rights abuses created a strong presumption against
decentralization.
Such shifts in public attitudes, in conjunction with the rise of the
administrative ethic and the positive state, undermined the position of
the states vis-a-vis the national government and biased political devel-
81. RIKER, supra note 80, at 155.
82. See C. VANN WOODWARD, REtmUION AND REACTION xi-xii (1966); cf. Richard
Young & Jerome Burstein, Federalism and the Demise of Prescriptive Racism in the United
States, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 1 (1995) (explaining that the civil rights movement was
made possible by fragmented political structure).
83. See KARL, supra note 62, at 5; RiVLIN, supra note 58, at 91-109. See generally
David Fellman, The Nationalization of American Civil Liberties, in EsSAYS ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).
84. See Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Assessing Government, 4 THE
PUB. PERSP. 87 (1993).
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opment toward greater centralization. Political interests and ideals
were reshaped by socioeconomic events and political movements that
favored centralization. Restructuring federalism per se was rarely the
specific goal of these various efforts, but it was often a necessary
means and an accepted byproduct. The logic of the modem state was
one of centralization, and federalism was increasingly understood in
nationalizing terms. The most important policies were to be devel-
oped at the national level, and governmental resources shifted up-
ward. National policy-making dominated American politics, even
when it did not directly supplant local policies. Centralization of
power in the federal government became the guiding presumption,
both descriptively and prescriptively.
I. The Changing Foundations of the Modern State
The developing logic that biased the federal system toward cen-
tralization reached its zenith in the 1960s. More recent political devel-
opments, however, have altered the foundations upon which the
growth of the modern state depended. Those basic forces that en-
couraged centralization through most of the twentieth century have
exhausted themselves, and the centralizing bias that was present ear-
lier this century has correspondingly weakened. Moreover, an exami-
nation of emerging political currents suggests that the forces of change
may instead favor decentralization. Specifically, socioeconomic and
ideological change has eroded support for the governmental functions
and ideologies that fostered centralization, while states have strength-
ened their own institutional and political position though electoral and
fiscal reforms. An opening for a return to decentralization has ap-
peared as the result of further economic changes and reevaluations,
the collapse of faith in progressive governmental activism, and a revi-
talization of the moral and institutional capacity of state governments
vis-h-vis the national government. Thus, conditions for decentraliza-
tion are fairly well established, and important and striking examples of
the movement toward actual decentralization are evident in recent
politics.
A. The End of Liberalism
Activist liberalism underwrote the accession of the modern state
and the expansion of the national government through a succession of
political movements beginning at the turn of the century. Recent de-
cades have witnessed the collapse of liberalism as the dominant polit-
ical ideology, undermining the legitimating public philosophy behind
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centralization and the substantive governmental commitments that re-
quired centralization."' The old liberal consensus has been frag-
mented, without a replacement, by a newly dominant set of
substantive commitments.86 The collapse of liberalism and the con-
comitant push toward decentralization is marked by three primary de-
velopments: increasing distrust of government, fiscal constraint, and
the rise of "special interest" politics.
Perhaps the defining feature of modern liberalism was the aban-
donment of the historical liberal fear of governmental power and the
adoption of the Progressive faith that government was a force for so-
cial good, which allowed for expansion of governmental functions.87
Nonetheless, tensions remained within liberalism's embrace of gov-
ernmental activism, which eventually fragmented the support for lib-
eralism itself.88 The "vital center" of modern liberalism gave way
under attack from both the left and the right. The New Left posed a
radical challenge to liberalism's ambivalent embrace of the positive
state.8 9 Much of the social democracy embraced by the New Left re-
quired small communities to engage in participatory politics instead of
relying on a strong national government to challenge corporations.
The radical goals of the New Left did not match the conservative or
reformist goals of established liberalism. Similarly, as the national
government became the central feature of the modern state, liberta-
rian challenges increasingly focused on abuse of national powers,
dramatized by the Vietnam War and Watergate. Modern American
liberalism had never come to terms with the state power that was nec-
essary to achieving its goals, and thus was not well positioned to ad-
dress state power when its darker side became obvious in the 1960s
and 1970s.9°
The vital center was also fragmented by attacks from the New
Right.91 The New Right was not without its statist elements, espe-
85. See infra notes 87-127 and accompanying text.
86. See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA 33-108 (1996); E. J.
DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERiCANs HATE PoIirncs 31-143 (1992).
87. See SIDNEY FINE, LAIssEz FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 12-25
(1966); DAwLEY, supra note 62, at 211-14.
88. See generally ALLEN J. MArusow, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA (1984); Lowi,
supra note 70, at 3-100.
89. See generally JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
LEFT 218-306 (1992); MArusow, supra note 88, at 275-394; JAMES MILLER, "DEMOCRACY
IS IN THE STRE~xs" 65-155 (1987).
90. See LowI, supra note 70, at 41-54.
91. See JoHN EHRMAN, THE RISE OF NEOCONSERVATISM 1-62 (1995).
cially in regards to national security.92 Nonetheless, the New Right
inherited and revitalized the Old Right's critique of the modem state's
economic regulation, while explicitly defending a more decentralized
version of federalism.93 The regulatory and redistributionist logic at
the center of the modern national state was directly challenged by the
Right as economically harmful and morally questionable. 94 President
Reagan memorialized the new public philosophy of the Right when he
insisted that "government is not the solution to our problem; govern-
ment is the problem." 95 Reformist faith in the progressive capacity of
the national government to solve social and economic ills was deeply
attenuated in favor of a renewed belief in the benevolence of the in-
visible hand.
Although President Reagan's immediate achievements in paring
back the federal government were less revolutionary than his rhetoric,
he did capture a changing public mood. Today, distrust of the govern-
ment is as high as trust of the government was during the height of
liberalism; moreover, such distrust has been the dominant public atti-
tude since the Watergate era.96 Though not all governmental func-
tions are equally disfavored, many of the centralized functions
pursued by the modern state, such as income redistribution and eco-
nomic regulation, are particularly disfavored. 97 In addition to the
Right's general attack on the positive state, Reagan specifically linked
centralization to the problems of "Big Government." Although Rea-
gan's commitment to decentralization was in tension with other ele-
ments of the Right's agenda, his election and legacy are widely seen
by scholars of federalism as an important blow to centralized liber-
alism.98 Centralization has become a specific target for the public's
increasing skepticism about government. The federal government is
now the least trusted level of government. As a result, increasing plu-
92. See GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MovEmENT IN
AMERuCA 1-35, 94-130 (1979). See generally MICHAEL W. MILES, THE ODYSSEY OF THE
AMERICAN RIGHT (1980).
93. See MILES, supra note 92, at 241-344; NASH, supra note 92, at 186-219.
94. See NASH, supra note 92, at 271-89.
95. RONALD REAGAN, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1
(1982).
96. See Carl Everett Ladd, The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Re-
alignment Continues, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 8-14 (1995).
97. The public makes exceptions for such specific issues as social security and environ-
mentalism. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRIcE OF FEDERALISM 44 (1995). See generally
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, How Much Government-Devolution, 6 PUB.
PERSP. 26 (1995) (hereinafter Roper Center).
98. See Richard L. Cole, et al., Reversing Directions: A Ranking and Comparison of
Key U.S. Intergovernmental Events, 1960-1980 and 1980-1995, 26 PUBLIUS 25, 27 (1996).
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ralities favor decentralizing governmental power.9 President Clinton
has declared that he also embraces the end of "Big Government," a
testament to the current distrust of government, and he, too, has em-
braced decentralizing initiatives such as welfare reform."° Because
liberalism has been fractured to the point that it can no longer sustain
centralization, and even if no alternative ideology has yet gained dom-
inance, the ascendant political questions and assumptions at the end
of the twentieth century are radically different from those at the be-
ginning, with substantial implications for the decentralization of
federalism.
Liberalism has also declined as a result of "deficit politics." 10'
Federal budgeting has undergone a basic reconceptualization, from a
postwar expectation of incremental revenue growth to a recognition
beginning in the late 1960s of fundamental fiscal constraints.10 2 The
fiscal politics of the 1980s and 1990s is only an amplified version of
this basic acceptance of budgeting as requiring tradeoffs among fa-
vored programs, a generalization of the "guns versus butter" concerns
of the Johnson administration. 0 3 Moreover, retrenchment in the do-
mestic budget was an explicit part of the Reaganite conservative
message, linking the ideal of fiscal constraints to an ideological vision
and a policy program.'04 The availability of funds for new social pro-
grams could no longer be assumed. The apparent continued expan-
sion of the federal fiscal capacity that had fueled the twentieth century
centralization had reached its limits.
New fiscal limits are partly the function of a restructured econ-
omy and partly a function of new political sensibilities. The wave of
"tax revolts" that began in the states and spread to the national gov-
ernment in the late 1970s have imposed sharp constraints on the abil-
ity of the federal government to reclaim the fiscal advantage of earlier
99. See Timothy J. Conlan, Federal, State, or Local? Trends in the Public's Judgment, 4
Pun. PERSP. 3 (1993); Roper Center, supra note 97.
100. See DONAHUE, supra note 64, at 32-37; STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE PoLITIcs
PPESIDENTs MAKE 409-46 (1993); Robert Kuttner, Reaganism, Liberalism, and the Demo-
crats, in THE REAGAN LEGACY 99, 108-16 (Sidney Blumenthal & Thomas Byrne Edsall
eds., 1988).
101. See generally DONALD F. KIr, DEFICIT POLICS (1992); Paul E. Peterson, The
New Politics of Deficits, in THE NEw DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 365 (John E.
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
102. See ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MoNEY 19-32 (1980).
103. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE CAPACITY TO BUDGET 1-83 (1990); Kam, supra note
101, at 38-67. In that context, the current prospect of a balanced budget is a temporary
phenomenon that will soon be dwarfed by federal entitlement commitments.
104. See JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS AND AMERICAN POLITICS 198-236
(1988).
decades.105 In particular, the indexation of tax rates has placed real
limits on the ability of the federal government to expand its revenue
base without an explicit, and politically risky, vote for tax hikes.0 6
One consequence has been that declining military spending has re-
duced the perceived importance of the national government without
producing the expected "peace dividend" that could be readily shifted
to other federal activities. 107 Political stalemate reinforced the ideal of
fiscal restraint. The handful of programs that were allowed to grow,
primarily defense and entitlements, only added to the fiscal pressures
and political tensions faced by most social programs. After account-
ing for what became known as "non-discretionary" spending, there
were few federal funds remaining to address new liberal concerns or
to sustain the old.'08 Deficits did not lead to the type of spending cuts
advocated by conservatives, but they did have real effects in under-
mining the political base of modern liberalism.
Deficit politics is relevant to the decline of centralization because
it both weakens liberalism and undermines "fiscal federalism." The
political response to the deficit has placed severe limits on the na-
tional government's ability to take positive action. Conservative
claims of governmental ineffectiveness in addressing social ills became
a self-fulfilling prophecy as relative fiscal austerity was demanded in
response to large federal deficits. In addition, the limitations imposed
on spending made fiscal policy resemble a zero-sum game. Conse-
quently, all the political players became increasingly distrustful of one
another, and recipients of the governmental largesse have been in-
creasingly the object of taxpayer scorn.0 9 Welfare recipients, for ex-
ample, have been viewed as parasites of public largesse, especially
when fiscal politics revolves around scarcity."0 The federal govern-
ment is now viewed as providing the least amount of services per tax-
payer dollar, while state governments have increasingly been lauded
105. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION 116-36
(1991).
106. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 193-97
(1990); KETTL, supra note 101, at 119-20.
107. See DONAHUE, supra note 64, at 9-11, 34-37.
108. See KETTL, supra note 101, at 129-42. See generally PETERSON, supra note 101.
109. See CLAUS O=, COrRADICIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 147-60, 193-202
(John Keane, ed., 1984); LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 155-90 (1980).
110. See generally Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Welfare: American Di-
lemma, 6 PUB. PERsP. 39 (1995) (hereinafter Roper Center).
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for their fiscal efficacy."' Thus, as distrust of national fiscal policy has
increased, a corresponding decline in the liberal foundation for cen-
tralized federalism becomes ever more evident.
More directly, deficit politics has weakened support for intergov-
ernmental transfers, a key component of postwar centralization. Aid
to states has proven politically vulnerable relative to such priorities as
military and entitlement spending. Since the mid-1970s, real growth
in federal grants to states and localities has slowed considerably and
declined as a percentage of the federal budget." 2 Meanwhile, state
governments have revitalized their own fundraising capacity. Exclud-
ing trust fund accounts, state and local governments now claim nearly
as large a share of GNP as does the federal government for the first
time since the New Deal."3 Consequently, federal grants have also
fallen as a percentage of state and local expenditures from mid-1970s
peaks. States and localities, rather than dependents, are now competi-
tors with the federal government for revenue."" The national govern-
ment is losing a key tool for influencing state behavior, leaving states
to respond to their own political dynamics rather than those of the
national government." 5
A final element contributing to the end of liberalism is the ideo-
logical transformation of pluralistic interest group politics into corrupt
special interest politics. The primary change occurred in dominant
normative judgments rather than political behavior, and deficit poli-
tics helped to redefine the political perception of interest group poli-
tics.' 6 Pluralism becomes more difficult to maintain in periods of
scarcity than in periods of abundance. Theodore Lowi recognized
that interest group liberalism developed in part to obscure the coer-
cive exercise of state authority. In the context of postwar abundance,
interest group competition created a veneer of voluntarism and con-
cealed the need to legitimize public authority." 7 In the context of
111. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS [ACIR],
CHANGING PUBLIC ATrrruDs ON GovERNmENTs AND TAXES 7 (1990); Roper Center,
supra note 97, at 87-90.
112. See OMB, supra note 61, at 194-95.
113. See Shannon & Kee, supra note 7, at 7-12.
114. See id.
115. See Chubb, supra note 18, at 277-81. In addition to protecting key constituents
against the most severe effects of fiscal retrenchment, politicians have also reacted by turn-
ing to political mechanisms that do not cost the government money. It remains to be seen
how extensively "unfunded mandates" will be used to maintain centralization. See Kin-
caid, supra note 18, at 148-52.
116. See ALLAN J. CIGLER & BuRDETT A. LooMIs, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1-28
(1995).
117. See LowI, supra note 70, at 29-97.
fiscal scarcity, however, the legitimacy of other interest groups is less
easily recognized when their gains come at the expense of others;
"they" become "special" interests that corrupt politics rather than
share in good government.
As decision-making was centralized and increasingly shifted from
Congress to the executive branch, representation of political interests
at the national level included leaders and agents of organized interest
groups in the policy-making process." 8 However, despite the initial
expectations, interest group pluralism was never all-inclusive. Impor-
tant, and occasionally politically influential, social interests were often
not represented." 9 At times, the limitation on interest inclusion con-
strained the government's ability to make stable and effective pol-
icy.12 0  More importantly, the evident truncation of pluralist
representation helped undermine its legitimacy. As old organizations
fragmented, new "public" interest groups arose.12 ' The proliferation
of new interest groups served less to revitalize the authority of the
liberal state than to subvert the basis for its authority. 22 Distinguish-
ing between "public" and "private" interests merely called into ques-
tion the legitimacy of interest group decision-making. Once interest
groups appear to represent parochial concerns rather than the com-
mon good, trust in governmental decision-making that is heavily influ-
enced by group politics is undermined. Vast majorities now believe
that "government is the problem," and that it is run for the benefit of
"special interests," though there remains support for some specific
governmental actions."z  While the bureaucratic consensus that
guided the positive state may serve some interests and do some good,
it appears unlikely that it can locate the genuinely public good
effectively. 24
118. See CIGLER & LooMis, supra note 116, at 11-25; JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMO-
CRATIC WISH 129-43 (1990); Lowi, supra note 40, at 101-24.
119. See Lowi, supra note 70, at 68-97; HAWLEY, supra note 71, at 72-146. See generally
PETER BAcHRAcH & MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER AND PoVERTY (1970); GRANT MCCON-
NELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
120. See HAWLEY, supra note 71, at 19-146.
121. See Thomas L. Gais, et al., Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Insti-
tutions in American National Government, 14 BIT. J. POL. SCL 161, 166-77 (1984). See
generally Jack L. Walker, The Origin and Maintenance of Interest Groups, 77 AM. POL. Sci.
REv. 390 (1983).
122. See CIGLER & Loomis, supra note 116, at 1-28.
123. Ladd, supra note 96, at 13.
124. See Balogh, supra note 33, at 171.
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Finally, interest group liberalism depended on a political consen-
sus, even a manufactured one, in order to operate.'2- The willingness
to delegate governmental policy-making to executive branch officials
and an administrative elite hinged on the ability of the political elite to
portray such decisions as merely technical or instrumental. Such a
representation is viable only so long as there is an underlying agree-
ment on political ends and legitimate means. Pragmatism does not
replace ideology as much as it replaces ideological conflict. Policy-
making could be delegated and centralized in a handful of bureau-
cratic venues because the crucial political decisions had already, at
least implicitly, been made. However, the breakdown of the liberal
consensus repoliticizes government. Power is fragmented as adminis-
trative expertise is challenged by alternative experts, exposing the
political aspects of "neutral" decision-making.'26 Moreover, the re-
politicization of government encourages legislative rather than execu-
tive politics. Legislative politics benefit from greater permeability to
social interests, openness to public scrutiny, and participation than is
characteristic of executive politics, which is crucial to rebuilding polit-
ical consensus for governmental action. The proliferation of partici-
pants and points of access fragments and decentralizes decision-
making. 27 Legislative politics, in the absence of consensus, also
brings electoral risks to legislators, however, and congressmen may
increasingly pass hard choices back to the states. In any case, the de-
cline of liberalism as the source of public authority undercuts a key
justification for political centralization.
Both the success of an ideological consensus and the substantive
commitments of modern liberalism underwrote the modern state. But
the current crisis for liberalism delegitimizes and fragments the state,
shifting power and authority to alternative institutions, both public
and private. The fragmentation of the old consensus has left a linger-
ing distrust of centralized governmental policy-making. The contin-
gent ideological and political underpinnings of the functional utility of
centralization have been exposed. Meanwhile, the national govern-
125. See Lowi, supra note 70, at 30-84; MORONE, supra note 118, at 97-143, 253-320.
See generally Balogh, supra note 33.
126. See ROHR, supra note 35, at 133-93; Balogh, supra note 33, at 166-72; SKOWRONEK,
supra note 33, at 361-406.
127. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 440-59
(1981); Michael Mezey, The Legislature, the Executive and Public Policy: The Futile Quest
for Congressional Power, 13 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 12-15 (1986). Legislative politics
has historically been decentralizing, within both the national government and the federal
structure. There are, however, limits to that relative decentralization. See Chubb, supra
note 18, at 275-92.
ment has lost its comparative advantage in fiscal and administrative
capacity, as the states have built up their resources and the national
government has limited its own. Centralization now offers fewer
political advantages and carries less ideological appeal than it did
through most of the twentieth century. In this context, the states are
both more capable and more likely to take a leading role in policy-
making.
B. The Entrepreneurial State
The modern state has been shaken not only by an ideological cri-
sis, but also by changes in economic conditions and understandings to
which the state structure was a response. The economy has not re-
turned to its precorporate form, but rather has developed beyond the
period of industrial consolidation that made administrative control
seem both desirable and possible.'28 The national government held a
comparative advantage relative to the states at the turn of the century
in seemingly standing above the market and maintaining its ability for
autonomous decision-making. That advantage has dissipated in re-
cent years, and the national government now occupies a position that
is similar to that of the states themselves.' 29
A primary aspect of that change is the globalization of the Ameri-
can economy.' 30 Just as the rise of interstate corporations trans-
formed the logic of postbellum federalism, so the rise of transnational
corporations has altered the foundations of the modern state. Most
notably, the globalization of the economy has meant that there is no
escaping the market. Interstate corporations and the consolidation of
the domestic economy threatened to outstrip the capacity of the states
or the market to control them, but also opened the possibility of an
effective national response. One effect of globalization is to weaken
the apparent need for a strong national state. Nineteenth-century
market failures called for a national response because corporations no
longer seemed disciplined by the market. Global competition has in-
stead emphasized the vulnerability of American corporations to ex-
panded market forces. A managed economy seems less viable,
rendering moot the earlier question of whether the economy would be
128. See MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 134-208 (1993);
infra note 146.
129. See infra notes 130-45, and accompanying text.
130. See ROBERT B. REICH, Ti WoRK OF NATIONS 81-168 (1991); LESTER C.
TUROw, THE FuTuRE OF CAPITALiSM 115-38 (1996). See generally KENICHI OHMAE,
THE BORDERLESS WORLD (1990); KEhnH OHMAE, THE END OF Ti NATION STATE
(1995).
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under private or public control. The discipline of the global market
has displaced the accepted need for governmental regulation, while
highlighting the cost of such regulation to American business. 13 1
Equally important, globalization has weakened governmental
sovereignty, the perceived governmental ability to make and enforce
autonomous decisions.' 32 This does not hearken the withering away
of the state or the end of nationalism, but it does suggest that the
national government is no longer in the commanding position that it
was a century ago. The United States has itself been transformed over
the past few decades from an island community into an integrated part
of an international economic system. As a consequence, there is no
longer the perceived state capacity to control the economy that was
once available. The value of centralization was that it could overcome
political and market fragmentation. To the extent that there is still
support for some aspects of the positive state, the expression of gov-
ernmental activism is increasingly hedged in by a recognition of the
limits of governmental power. The regulatory and redistributive bur-
dens that could be safely imposed on interstate corporations are more
costly when imposed on multinationals, weakening the political will to
tax corporate profits or impose new social regulations. 33 As a result,
the national government now finds itself in a position similar to that
faced by the states at the turn of the century-a market participant
rather than a sovereign over the market. Thus, political centralization
no longer seems to provide the benefits of economic management.
The national government has gradually been pushed from the
role of social regulator to one of competitive provider of public serv-
ices, a return to governmental competition that was anathema to cen-
tralized federalism.' The expressions of this pressure are various.
As economic globalization rapidly expanded in the 1970s and 1980s,
the United States was one of many nations to reform its tax system in
order to reduce the costs imposed on the most fluid elements of the
economy. 35 The resulting fiscal constraints limited governmental ac-
tivism and eroded fiscal autonomy, one of the advantages of centrali-
131. See, e.g., Roger Lowenstein, Trust in Markets: Antitrust Enforcers Drop the Ideol-
ogy, Focus on Economics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.
132. See RicHARD B. McKENZIE & DwiGHT B. LEE, QUICKSILVER CAPITAL 84-156
(1991); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE 44-87 (1996). See generally SASKIA
SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? (1996).
133. See SEN STErNMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY 156-92 (1993); Eisner, supra
note 128, at 170-201.
134. See DYE, supra note 61, at 1-34. See also JEAN-Luc MGUE, FEDERALISM AND
FREE TRADE 13-40 (1993).
135. See STEINMO, supra note 133, at 156-92.
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zation. Two governmental functions, regulation and redistribution,
are particularly conducive to centralization because both impose costs
that mobile economic actors seek to escape through flight. Modern
liberalism called for the government to engage in both of these activi-
ties, and centralization allowed the government to impose those costs
on relatively immobile, national actors in the early twentieth century.
In an international economy, such policies have become more difficult
to maintain. Although there remains popular pressure for certain
forms of regulation, the regulatory costs borne by market participants
have become an increasingly prominent part of the political calcula-
tion of policy-makers. The response has been deregulation and rela-
tive regulatory restraint.'36 Similarly, redistributive policies are seen
as increasingly costly. Although intergenerational transfers remain
popular, welfare policies have become relatively unpopular as the
costs have been emphasized. 137 Weakening political support for redis-
tributive policies has resulted in direct retrenchment or in a shifting of
redistributive burdens to the states, which are subject to even greater
competitive pressures than the national government. 38 Economic
globalization reinforces ideological changes by altering the mix of pol-
icies pursued by government. The same types of policies that under-
wrote centralization through most of the twentieth century are those
most affected by economic openness and the decline of liberalism. 39
Economic and social regulations that might be costly to business now
face added hurdles, leaving them less aggressively enforced or off the
legislative agenda.
The government has not sunk into inactivity. An emerging
method of political competition is the search for "value added" poli-
cies, or "public investment.' 40 The turn to public investment is a nat-
ural one, reflecting the loss of political control over economic
conditions. The government justifies itself through its ability to add
value to society through the services it provides, just as other eco-
nomic actors do. It is precisely such developmental policies as crime
control and education that have retained or garnered public support
136. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QumRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 29-
146 (1985); Eisner, supra note 128, at 170-201.
137. See PETERSON, supra note 97, at 44. See generally Roper Center, supra note 110.
138. See DONAHUE, supra note 64, at 120-42; PETERSON, supra note 97, at 16-49, 108-28.
139. Military protection remains the one public service for which national governments
remain the premier provider, but the end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the
importance of this national activity. See generally STRANGE, supra note 132.
140. REIcH, supra note 130, at 252-61.
Summer 19981
514 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:483
in the past decade.141 Such public investments demonstrate their suc-
cess by an ability to improve the national business climate or net so-
cial well-being. As a provider of public services, however, the federal
government has no natural comparative advantage over the states and
in many cases may be at a disadvantage given its relative inflexibility
in adjusting to highly fluid and localized conditions and desires. 42
States and localities remain the primary provider of such developmen-
tal policies. 43 American federalism has resulted in a functional policy
specialization by the different levels of government. As the policy mix
of the political agenda changes, different levels of government take
priority.'44 To the extent that developmental policies dominate poli-
tics, centralized federalism carries little appeal. State and local poli-
tics become more "relevant" than federal politics.' 45
A second and related aspect of this economic transformation has
been characterized as "post-industrialism.' 46 The most relevant fea-
tures of post-industrialism for present purposes are its effects on the
economic environment within which the federal system operates and
on the administrative ethic within the government itself. Technology
and changing managerial practices have substantially altered the way
corporations operate. Notably, corporate organizations are more far-
flung, and decision-making is more decentralized. Technology has al-
lowed business to globalize operations while speeding its adjustments
to external and internal problems. Relative liquidity in capital forma-
tion and production allows modern firms to move more quickly to
141. See PETERSON, supra note 97, at 44, 65.
142. See PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE 64-69
(1988); DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 283-88 (1988); RlvLN, supra
note 58, at 116-22.
143. See generally PETERSON, supra note 97.
144. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 216-34 (1993).
145. A second response to economic globalization has been the formation of limited
intergovernmental entities, especially common as part of trade pacts. Overall, however,
such efforts tend to fragment political power further, siphoning power and authority away
from national governments without legitimating new supranational governments. More-
over, such intergovernmental entities have more often sought to work within markets than
attempt to control or supplant them in the fashion of twentieth century centralization. See
STRANGE, supra note 132, at 161-81; cf Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global
Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1447-71 (1994). See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING
Up (1995).
146. See KANTOR, supra note 69, at 77-111; MCKENZIE & LEE, supra note 132, at 158-
219; REICH, supra note 31, at 117-225; THuRow, supra note 109, at 65-87. See generally
Daniel Bell, Tim COMING OF PosT-INDusTRIAL SOCIETY (1973); PETER F. DRUCKER,
POsT-CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1993); THmRRY J. NoYELLE, BEYOND INDUSTRIAL DUALISM
(1987); SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988).
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take advantage of market opportunities and to escape government-
imposed costs. Such fluidity has also destabilized the operating envi-
ronment of the administered corporate economy, as current capital
markets allow not only corporate growth but also intermarket pene-
tration and rapid upstarts.147 The reduced geographic commitment of
modem corporations minimizes the target for political control. Not
only has global competition increased the economic impact of govern-
ment-imposed costs on domestic firms, but post-industrialism has en-
hanced the ability of firms to escape those costs. 148
Post-industrial management has also altered the administrative
ethic that helped legitimate and guide centralization. Rather than
monopolizing and managing information from the top, firms require
information to be acted upon by those closest to the ultimate market
or production process as emphasized by such innovations as "team
management" and decreased production line specialization. Organi-
zational changes have also tried to recreate market structures within
the corporate form, whether through "outsourcing" or performance-
based compensation.149 Like the administrative ethic, post-industrial
organizational developments both structure governmental functions
and are internalized in governmental operations. The "reinventing
government" movement attempts to carry the reforms of private cor-
porations into the public bureaucracy. 5 ° Central to such efforts is the
decentralization of decision-making to lower levels of the bureau-
cracy. Not only does this fragment the national bureaucracy, but it
also shifts responsibility to subnational policy-makers and administra-
tors.' 5 ' The effective pursuit of governmental objectives is increas-
ingly seen as requiring decentralization, empowering actors outside
147. See DRUCKER, supra note 146, at 19-110; MCKENZIE & LEE, supra note 132, at 35-
83. See generally NOYELLE, supra note 146.
148. See DRUCKER, supra note 146, at 113-78; KANTOR, supra note 69, at 77-111; Mc-
KENZIE & LEE, supra note 132, at 84-157; REICH supra note 130, at 81-153; THUROW, supra
note 109, at 115-37, 271-78. See generally SASSEN, supra note 146.
149. See generally WILLIAM H. DAVIDOW & MICHAEL S. MALONE, TAE VIRTUAL COR-
PORATION (1992); MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAmBy, REENGINEERING T=m CORPORA-
TION (1993); JOHN NAISBITr & PATRICIA ABURDENE, E-INVENTING THE CORPORATION
(1985); Noyelle, supra note 146; GnORD & ELIZABETH PINCHOT, THE END OF BUREAU-
CRACY & THE RISE OF THE INTELLIGENT ORGANIZATION (1994); THUROW, supra note 130,
at 79-82.
150. See generally AL- GORE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REviEw, FROM RED TAPE TO
RESULTS (1993); MICHAEL BARZELAY, BREAKING THROUGH BUREAUCRACY (1992);
David Osborne & Ted Gabler, Reinventing Government (1992); James P. Pinckerton,
What Comes Next 51-128 (1995).
151. See generally David B. Walker, The Advent of an Ambiguous Federalism and the
Emergence of New Federalism III, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 271 (1996).
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the national government to make crucial decisions about policy goals,
design, and implementation. Such reforms also try to integrate or
reproduce market processes in governmental programs, from school
choice to tradable pollution emission permits.152 As with Progressive
era bureaucratization, such reforms bring substantive political change
in the guise of neutral technical adjustments. To the extent that policy
experts and the general public absorb this postindustrial perspective,
the use of centralized bureaucratic mechanisms to solve social
problems will be less compelling. Just as railroad regulation empha-
sized the central government, airline deregulation chipped away at the
significance of the national government. 53 Likewise, the decentrali-
zation of decision-making within government reduces the importance
of the national government even when government is active.
Socioeconomic changes, and how we understand those changes,
have reinforced many of the political ramifications from the fragmen-
tation of support for modern liberalism. Globalization and post-in-
dustrialism have weakened the value of centralization by reducing the
autonomy of the national state. The increased costs and decreased
benefits of many regulatory and redistributive policies have helped to
alter the mix of favored governmental functions. In this new political
and economic environment, the national government occupies a less
commanding position, and the state governments are likely to play a
more important role providing the types of public services-from edu-
cation to crime control-most in demand.
C. The New Public Morality
Just as the centralization of federal relations was advanced by the
national government's seizure of the moral high ground, so the decen-
tralization of federalism requires the moral recovery of the states.
Significant decentralization is not viable if the states fail to eradicate
the corruption and the incompetence of the past. The moral authority
of the national government has been in relative decline since the late
1960s, while the states have gradually recovered public confidence.' 4
The momentary shape of federalism is a function of historical forces,
not the natural progression from fragmented states to an ever more
centralized national system. Past shifts toward centralization are not
152. See DioNNE, supra note 86, at 242-99; PINClEROTN, supra note 150, at 255-318.
153. See DERTHICK & QuIRK , supra note 136, at 29-56; see also Garry Wills, Washing-
ton Is Not Where It's At, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Jan. 25, 1998, at 26.
154. See generally Roper Center, supra note 97.
irreversible. 55 For those who define the moral authority of federal-
ism by the standards of desegregation efforts, the contingency of the
relationship between moral authority and centralization is not obvi-
ous.' 56 Nonetheless, more recent developments have made possible
precisely that political decoupling, as the priority of national uniform-
ity has been reduced and the competence of the state governments has
increased.
Decentralization opens the possibility of diversity, as different
states will adopt divergent policies and standards. 57 Decentralization
gives play to the diverse policy preferences of the individual states,
requiring a political environment that will tolerate the expression of
such diversity.' 58 But, as Ronald Dworkin has pointed out, moralism
cannot abide a "checkerboard" of different political outcomes.'59 To
the extent that the subject matter of politics is one of principle, the
bias of centralization is increased as uniform outcomes are sought. A
moral universalism cannot abide regarding slavery, or more recently
segregation, as merely the "peculiar institution" of the South, but
rather must approach it as a blight upon the nation as a whole. Local
compromises are unacceptable if justice is at stake, and local tradi-
tions are expendable if universal truths can be applied in their stead.
A decline in the influence of such universalistic moral movements give
rise to the potential for decentralization. The presence of diversity, in
and of itself, ceases to be a reason to centralize.
One avenue for shedding a commitment to uniformity is the lo-
calization of values and positive acceptance of diversity.' 60 Although
universalist theories remain influential, recent intellectual currents
emphasize the plurality and historicity of moral values. 6' Communi-
tarian, neo-pragmatist, and post-modernist theorizing all reject univer-
salism in favor of recognizing diverse, historically specific moral
155. See generally Keith E. Whittington, The Political Constitution of Federalism in An-
tebellum America: The Nullification Debate as an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of
Constitutional Change, 26 PuBLtus 1 (1996).
156. See, e.g., KENNETH S. STERN, A FORCE UPON =HE PLAIN 219-20 (1996).
157. See generally Aaron Wildavsky, Federalism Means Inequality: Political Geometry,
Political Sociology, and Political Culture, in TmE CosTs OF FEDERALISM 55 (Robert T.
Golembiewski & Aaron Wildavsky eds., 1984).
158. See DYE, supra note 61, at 41-44, 189-90.
159. See RONALD DwoRN, LAW'S EMmpRE 178-84 (1986).
160. See ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHy, STATE, AND UTOPIA 297-334 (1974). An addi-
tional possibility for decentralization, even in the face of universalistic commitments, is
through the positive adoption of decentralization or localism as a competing value to be
balanced against other moral goods. The rise of a new substantive vision of "states' rights"
seems unlikely, however.
161. See SEYLA BENLABIm, SrruATING THE SELF 1-144 (1972).
Summer 19981 DISMANTLING THE MODERN STATE.?
518 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:483
traditions. 62 Without a moral trump of universalism, diversity may
not only be an acceptable outcome but may even be regarded as pref-
erable. Although state political boundaries are unlikely to be cotermi-
nous with favored ethical "communities," such non-universalistic
moral theories ultimately favor political decentralization. Moreover,
the rejection of a universalist imperative has resonance beyond such
esoteric theorizing.
For example, multiculturalism is a particular expression of such
thinking. Its influence in raising questions about the value of integra-
tion is indicative of the weakening of earlier moral certainties that
underwrote centralization.' 63 Another example is the Supreme
Court's weakening of a national, uniform standard of obscenity in
Miller v. California,'64 which requires the evaluation of material on
the basis of "community" values and is an example of the judicial ac-
ceptance of the possibility that localities will pursue different moral
visions.'65 Similarly, the Court's partial retreat from Roe v. Wade's 66
national standards regulating abortion in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services6 7 and Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania
v. Casey 68 are consistent with the acceptance of heterogeneity on
even a heavily moralized issue. In these cases, judicial "pragmatism"
is as useful for decentralization as judicial conservatism.
Acceptance of diversity also arises through the strategic weakness
of competing political factions. 6 9 The fragmentation of support for
earlier moral commitments has prevented the national imposition of
universalistic moral positions. Moralists have been forced to defend
strategic local strongholds rather than pursue an offensive national
struggle. 7 ° Morally infused political struggles over such issues as gay
rights, abortion, and affirmative action have raged at the local level,
even as reformers have been unable to advance their agenda at the
162. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); RIcHARD RORTY,
OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTi (1991); MICHAEL S. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMrrs OF JUsTICE (1987).
163. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON 15-33 (1997)
(providing a critical overview).
164. 413 U.S. 15 (1979).
165. See id. at 24; Derthick, supra note 37, at 70-72.
166. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
167. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
168. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
169. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 84-97, 101-35
(1991).
170. See, e.g., Edward G. Carmines & Geoffrey C. Layman, Issue Evolution in Postivar
American Politics: Old Certainties and Fresh Tensions, in PRESENT DiscoNTs 89 (Byron
E. Shafer ed., 1997).
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national level. The Court displayed a lingering nationalism in Romer
v. Evans,'7' when it struck down Colorado's Amendment Two. How-
ever, issues ranging from school curriculum, to environmentalism, to
affirmative action, to capital punishment are diversely resolved at the
state and local levels. 172 More generally, Romer appears to be a fairly
isolated effort on the part of a Court that has been generally unwilling
to inject itself strongly into local moral disputes. Efforts to inoculate
individual states and the national government against the effects of
Hawaii's expected legalization of homosexual marriages are indicative
of such political stalemates. Both sides have been able to use state
governments to advance their agenda but have been unable to nation-
alize their preferred outcome. 73 Diversity becomes an acceptable
second-best solution when political fragmentation prevents success at
the national level. Although such strategic diversity is potentially un-
stable and does not reflect a direct valorization of decentralized feder-
alism, it is nonetheless consistent with the historic foundations of
federalism and tends to weaken the foundations of centralization.
Finally, the commitment to uniformity may give way if dominant
political issues are seen as primarily pragmatic, rather than moral, in
nature. Such pragmatism may arise from a change in the political
agenda or from the exhaustion of a previously ascendant moral vision.
Although the overall tendency of the current political climate is diffi-
cult to gauge, several recent events illustrate the decentralizing thrust
of pragmatic politics and the minimization of its moral dimension.
Perhaps the most dramatic recent example is the reconstitution of
some federal welfare programs as block grants to the states rather
than as entitlements to individuals.174 The conflict over entitlements
clearly reflects partisan calculations of constituency interests and dif-
fering judgments on policy effectiveness, but it also reflects a recon-
ceptualization of the nature of welfare spending. Although never fully
national or uniform, welfare spending had briefly enjoyed moral sig-
nificance as an individual entitlement on social resources. 175 The cur-
rent welfare debate reflects a fundamental rethinking of social welfare
171. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
172. See DYE, supra note 61, at 41-44.
173. See Rhys H. Williams, Is America in a Culture War? Yes-No-Sort Of, CHmsTIAN
CENTURY, Nov. 12, 1997, at 1038; Christopher Caldwell, The Southern Captivity of the
GOP, ATLANTIC MoIHLY, June 1998, at 55.
174. See Robert Pear, House Democrats Assail Welfare Plan Backed by Governors,
N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 21, 1996, at A16.
175. See, e.g., Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See generally
Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal
Constitutional Theory, 58 Omo ST. L.J. 731 (1997).
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programs, including the influence of Charles Murray's work challeng-
ing the morality of welfare at the individual level and emphasizing an
aggregate, utilitarian analysis of social spending. 76 By contrast, Cath-
olic Charities, for example, criticized the reforms in the language of
individual rights and moral social responsibilities. 7  Liberal activists,
on the other hand, have sought to emphasize the wide range of likely
state welfare payments as evidence of state irresponsibility and a na-
tional moral crisis, achieving success only in such cases as intergenera-
tional transfers where the "moral" argument is still ascendant. 7 8 This
debate, which emphasizes "flaws in the welfare system," reflects an
increased focus on pragmatic policy "success" rather than the moral
character of individual claims on social resources.179 But a more prag-
matic welfare debate can tolerate subnational diversity and experi-
mentation, at the expense of individual claimants to supplemental
income. If there is no longer an agreed upon answer as to how social
goals are to be achieved or even as to what those goals are, then the
political argument for imposing one national outcome and displacing
multiple, locally chosen outcomes becomes less compelling. As the
moral certainties of earlier debates on issues ranging from race to con-
sumer safety give way to moral confusion or pragmatism, 80 then the
costs of diversity become more acceptable and the political support
for centralization becomes more tenuous.
A second element in the altered dynamic of public morality is the
recovery by the states of much of their legitimacy as independent poli-
ties. The foundation for such a recovery was laid with the state gov-
ernments' own internal reforms.18 ' Through accident, external
prodding, and internal agitation, the state governments have largely
managed to shed their image as venal backwaters. 82 Since the early
176. See generally CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984).
177. See Pear, supra note 174.
178. See Tom Teepen, Welfare "Reform" an Insult to the Poor, ATLANTA CONST., July
30, 1996, at AT.
179. See generally Roper Center, supra note 110.
180. See David. A. Hollinger, Group Preferences, Cultural Diversity and Social Democ-
racy: Notes Toward a Theory of Affirmative Action, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 31 (1996); Don
Phillips, Federal Speed Limit, Set in 1974, Repealed, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1995, at A16;
Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, In Welfare Decisions, One Size No Longer Fits All,
WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al.
181. See ANN BowMAN & RIcHARD C. KIAmRY, THE Resurgence of the States 1-104,
187-256 (1986); DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM 249-83 (1995). See
generally Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful,
509 ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAD. OF POL. & Soc. Sci. 83 (1990).
182. See generally Reeves, supra note 181; WALKER, supra note 181; BowmV1A & KEAR-
NmY, supra note 181.
1960s, state and local employment has grown at ten times the rate of
federal civilian employment, as the states have professionalized and
taken on new responsibilities.'83 The decline of political machines,
the reapportionment of state legislatures, and the expanded capacity
and expertise of state governing bodies, among other reforms, have all
improved the real and perceived quality of state government. As a
consequence, states have been able to demonstrate an ability to gov-
ern in a responsible manner, helping to overcome the lingering animus
of state failures to address the economic and social problems of indus-
trialization and racism. In an era of federal deficits, the states have
generally been constitutionally obliged to balance their budgets. Edu-
cation, tax, and welfare reform movements originated in the states.
State and local governments have been active in restructuring their
own operations to provide services more efficiently, and the states
have been highly responsive to changing policy preferences ranging
from assisted suicide, to term limits, to bilingual education. State gov-
ernments increasingly seem to be the dynamic and effective level of
government. 8" Such decentralization and "state empowerment" are
only viable for state and federal officeholders if state governments are
regarded as trustworthy political agents in their own right. In fact,
even as distrust of the federal government has risen, state and local
governments have gained the trust of distinct majorities of the general
public. 185
New state activism is important not only for enhancing the image
and legitimacy of the states, but also for expanding the relative impor-
tance of the states. Despite the ambivalence of many local reformers,
state activism had distinctly centralizing implications through much of
the twentieth century, as liberal regulatory and redistributive policies
required national intervention to be effective.' 86 More recent state
activism, by contrast, has shown state officials to be responsive to con-
stituent concerns while engaging in the types of developmental and
allocative activities that state governments can perform effectively. 87
State efforts ranging from tax reform, to welfare reform, to educa-
tional reform show the states to be dynamic polities that are more
likely to portray national policy as a hindrance than as an aid.
183. See DoNAHuE, supra note 64, at 10-11.
184. See Robert Pear, Governors Group Finds Agreement on Medicaid Plan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1995, at Al; Don Phillips, Safety Groups Aghast at Prospect of No National
Speed Limit, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1995, at C1.
185. See generally Conlan, supra note 99; Roper Center, supra note 97.
186. See KARL, supra note 62, at 25.
187. See generally OsBoR',N, supra note 142.
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Although state policy successes may be replicated in other govern-
ments,188 current state policy is less likely to require nationalization in
order to be effective than was the case with the Progressive reforms of
the earlier part of the century. In the past two decades, state and local
governments have actively formed and implemented their own poli-
cies, while increasingly relying on their own fiscal and administrative
resources.18 9 States are acting more as the independent decision-mak-
ers expected in federalism than as the functional administrators envi-
sioned by intergovernmental relations. 9
Ironically, the cause of centralized federalism has also been
weakened by its very success. Notably, the constitutional reordering
of the early twentieth century has established a new legal baseline,
most relevantly in the area of civil rights. The federal judiciary has
essentially legalized the general postwar consensus that expanded the
range of protected individual rights and sharply curtailed many tradi-
tionally accepted state practices. The worst governmental abuses in a
myriad of areas have been largely outlawed through statute, regula-
tion, and judicial pronouncement. The winning of such libertarian vic-
tories involved embarrassment and defeat on the part of the states,
but the current status of such legal protections now empowers the
states toward renewed importance. The states have regained trust, in
part because the federal judiciary provides an apparent guarantee that
they will not descend into actions now regarded as universally repre-
hensible. Meanwhile, the states can pursue more diverse "experimen-
tation" in areas of less national agreement.
IV. Countervailing Tendencies
There are a number of countervailing tendencies in current poli-
tics, however, that could support further centralization on different
grounds. For example, the twentieth century has also seen the gradual
nationalization of the media and social interests, often in response to
the increased activity of the national government itself.191 One result
of this nationalization of interests is a decreased tolerance for local
diversity. Just as television was instrumental in mobilizing national
opposition to Southern segregationists, so national interest groups
188. See Virginia Gray, Competition, Emulation, and Policy Innovation, in NEw PERSP.
ON AM. POL. 230, 237-38 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1994).
189. See generally Shannon & Kee, supra note 7; Conlan, supra note 99.
190. See Martin Diamond, The Ends of Federalism, in TiH FEDERAL PoLrTY 129, 130-
42 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1974); see also Garry Wills, The War Between the States .. .and
Washington, N.Y. TINrfs MAG., July, 5, 1998, at 26.
191. See MANSFIELD, supra note 169, at 170-72.
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currently mobilize to attack such localized policies as Colorado's
Amendment Two or California's heightened environmental measures.
Similarly, increased demographic mobility not only tends to homogen-
ize national populations and minimize local differences, but also to
reduce the individual citizen's attachment to subnational govern-
ments, which the Founders regarded as a crucial bulwark of state au-
thority. 92 Such cultural and political homogenization should not be
overstated, however. Local, state, and regional populations remain
distinct in their policy preferences and political identities. 193 Political
parties have also been weakened and nationalized, such that federal
officials are less responsive to the concern of local officials and more
directly concerned with constituent demands. As a consequence, the
institutional and ideological barrier to federal intervention in "local
issues" has been reduced. 94 Although globalization has been politi-
cally accepted to this point, the United States could experience a pop-
ulist rejection of current economic changes or a reconsideration of
how to respond to them. 9 In such circumstances, the national gov-
ernment could be strengthened in response to a different assessment
of economic costs. Finally, if liberal moralism is on the political de-
cline, there remains the possibility of a strengthened New Right mor-
alism. Efforts by some congressional Republicans to restrict the
eligibility of single mothers' benefits indicates the possibility of a re-
newed commitment to political centralization on behalf of a different
set of moral principles. 196 Similar centralizing dynamics can be seen
on such specific issues as environmentalism and drugs, where a politics
of principle has resisted decentralizing efforts. Such tendencies did
not underlie the original development of the modern state and the
growth of centralized federalism, but they may form new supports for
centralization even as the inherited modern state is significantly al-
tered. Given the transitional nature of current politics, continued cen-
tralization cannot be assumed, but rather the relevant dynamics
192. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
193. See, e.g., DYE, supra note 61, at 38-42; JoHN SHELTON REED, THE ENDURING
Sourm 1-7, 83-102 (1986); John J. Fitzpatrick & Rodney E. Hem, Political Culture and
Political Characteristics of the American States: A Consideration of Some Old and New
Questions, 41 WEST. POL. Q. 145-53 (1988).
194. See generally Chubb, supra note 18; James A. Reichley, The Rise of National Par-
ties, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN PoLrrIcs (John Chubb & Paul Peterson eds.,
1985).
195. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD V. MCWORLD (1995); PATRIcK J.
BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL (1998).
196. See generally Jeffrey L. Katz, Uneasy Compromise Reached on Welfare Overhaul,
CONG. REs. WKLY. REP., Sept. 16, 1995, at 2804.
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determining centralizing pressures need to be identified and
examined.
This analysis of the changing foundations of federalism also indi-
cates that a shift toward decentralized federalism would not simply be
reactionary. Federalism cannot be effectively understood through the
currently dominant dichotomy of idealized nationalism versus dual
federalism. 97 The particular historicized meaning of federalism is de-
termined by its development across time, not by shuttling between the
two ends of a stable spectrum of relative centralization. Focusing on
the political structures that underlie federalism emphasizes that rela-
tive decentralization is not closed off by past constitutional settle-
ments. Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments, for
example, usefully points to the political influences on constitutional
meaning, but both his particular narrative and his reliance on an
amendment theory of constitutional change creates a overarching
sense of unidirectional, progressive constitutional development.198
This essentially whiggish version of American constitutional history
leaves little sense that decentralization is a realistic possibility or that,
if accomplished, it could be anything other than a reversal of earlier
achievements. 99 The "new" decentralized federalism would not sim-
ply be a recreation of the old. Changes in the federal structure incor-
porate past developments, even if they shift the basic trajectory of the
political system.20 Thus, our understanding of constitutional change
or the future dynamics of federalism will not be advanced very far if
we are locked into comparisons with earlier variations on decentrali-
zation.21 The future of federalism will respond to emerging political
forces, such as new political ideologies and economic commitments,
that will not replicate old patterns, but will rather react to their own
historic logic. A new decentralization will not create, and does not
depend upon creating, either a nightwatchman state or rigid separate
spheres of governmental function.
197. See generally Nathan, supra note 11.
198. See generally AcKRcmAvN, supra note 2. Ackerman's approach also emphasizes
changes in judicial doctrines. But changes in federalism need not be accompanied by sub-
stantial doctrinal innovation, especially in the case of decentralization, which does not im-
pinge on the constraints of existing constitutional law.
199. See generally SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKNE A NATION (1993); DAVID F. ERICSON,
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN LIBERALIsM (1993).
200. See KARL, supra note 62; GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 72-87.
201. See, e.g., E.J. DIONNE, JR., THEY ONLY LOOK DEAD 203-07 (1996); Jess Bravin,
Confused About the Constitution, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1996, at C7.
V. Conclusion
The conception of federalism inherited from the early twentieth
century was the consequence of a particular set of historical, eco-
nomic, and political conditions that encouraged the development of
centralization as one incident of the development of the modem state.
Although political and judicial actors of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries occasionally considered the structure of federalism
explicitly, alterations in the constitutional understanding of federalism
were often the indirect result of other struggles. The coming together
of several basic tendencies in American politics put in place a distinct
logic that biased the political system toward greater centralization
during much of the past hundred years. Enduring alterations in the
role of government in American society and the relative public stand-
ing of the various levels of government gave a political advantage to
the national government vis-h-vis the states. Twentieth century cen-
tralization was characterized by the shifting of important policy deci-
sions and state capacity to the national government at the expense of
the states. That centralizing logic was consistent with the design and
language of the Constitution but was not required by it.
The historical variables that encouraged political centralization
have been changing in recent years. As a result, the structural logic
that impelled the country toward greater centralization has been
weakened, and a rather different logic is taking form in its place.
More specifically, the modern state was built on several national
trends: the rise of an administrative ethic that valorized bureaucratic
management and centralized decision-making, the development of a
regulatory and redistributive logic that required enhanced state capac-
ity and national reach in order to control the economic forces of the
industrializing corporate economy, and the transformation of the pub-
lic morality that contrasted the deficiencies and mendacity of the state
governments with the relative purity of the national government.
Those foundations of the modern state have gradually eroded, and
with them the driving force for centralization.
Most prominently, modern liberalism-as the ideology that un-
derwrote the development of the modern state-has suffered a crisis
of public authority. The economic conditions and understandings, to
which the modern state was a response, have been replaced through
the rise of post-industrialism and globalization. The public morality
has undergone changes that have elevated the relative status of the
states while undermining the moral authority of the national govern-
ment. As a result, the constitutional meaning of federalism has
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reached a transition point, when the old logic is increasingly inapplica-
ble and a new has yet to take firm hold.
A fundamental shift in the structure of federalism is possible, but
not yet certain. Existing constitutional structures can be understood,
but their future development is open to political choice and disrupting
events. Although the emerging tendencies discussed above are real,
they are not yet fully established and can be reversed. Moreover,
even as the centralizing logic of the modem state is eroding, no posi-
tively decentralizing logic has clearly emerged to take its place. Cer-
tainly, many of the forces that supported decentralization in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as an active substantive be-
lief in the value of localism or the existence of strong federated polit-
ical parties, are no longer present to reassert themselves.20 2
Additionally, since the centralizing modern state was the result of the
interaction of several variables, it is likely that any decentralizing mo-
mentum would also be the result of a confluence of forces.
The preconditions for a reconsideration of federalism are set.
Significant decentralization need not follow from these ideological, in-
stitutional, and socioeconomic changes, but those changes create an
opening for decentralization and offer some encouragement for doing
so. The Court's recent rulings are most appropriately seen as calling
attention to that opening rather than threatening to initiate radical
decentralization on its own. To this extent, the current Court has
shown itself to be relatively concerned with maintaining the indepen-
dence of the states as policy-making entities capable of responding to
their own diverse constituencies. Congressional efforts to coerce or
commandeer state governments to achieve national policy goals are
inconsistent with the increased quality, capacity, and responsiveness
of state governments of recent decades. The Court has been more
willing to remind national policy-makers of the independence of state
and local governmental officials.213 Somewhat differently, the Court
has also suggested a renewed willingness to define the boundaries of
national authority. Although the Court in United States v. Lopez2" 4
202. See Wildavsky, supra note 157, at 58-62. See generally Reichley, supra note 194.
203. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997) (holding the Brady Act's provision
requiring local law enforcement to conduct background checks unconstitutional); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding a provision requiring state to take title
of nuclear waste unconstitutional); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that minimum wage stan-
dards in Fair Labor Standards Act cannot apply to state employees performing traditional
governmental functions).
204. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
refused to break from post-New Deal formulations of the commerce
clause powers, it also clearly emphasized the idea of the federal gov-
ernment as one of "enumerated powers" in a fashion that would not
have been considered in the immediate postwar period. The Court is
revitalizing the notion that some matters are "local" in character, in
which national intervention is neither desirable nor manageable." 5
The key to future decentralization will not be in whether the Court is
willing to actively enforce such a constitutional vision, but rather in
whether future political actors accept it as a framework for American
politics.
Past changes in the structure of federalism highlight the impor-
tance of political analysis to the understanding of constitutional mean-
ing. Although judicial opinions play a significant role in representing
and formalizing conceptions of the Constitution, the focus should not
be on judicial leadership. The judiciary is only one actor in the crea-
tion of the constitutional order. A purely legal analysis obscures as
many of the changes taking place as it illuminates. The present Court
is gingerly responding to the same forces that are reshaping federalism
in a number of arenas. Moreover, even though the Court may hedge
the boundaries of permissible national or state action, it cannot deter-
mine the extent to which states recapture the political initiative or the
degree of political responsibility and public authority that the states
can claim for themselves. A new era of a less centralized conception
of federalism will be unlikely to return to the rigid separation of func-
tions and national inactivity characteristic of the nineteenth century.
Rather, a shift in our image of federalism is more likely to reflect a
reorientation in the political agenda, in which state and local govern-
ments take a more prominent role in public affairs and the activities of
the federal government are less important to the lives of the citizenry.
Recent tendencies suggest a return to the nineteenth century only in
that centralization now appears to carry less advantage than it had
through much of the twentieth century, when it promised to restore
the effectiveness of public power and to bring public policy in line
with a new moral sensibility. A more political analysis reveals the
shifting logic of federalism, exposing the biases that are built into the
inherited political structure and the foundations of those tendencies.
The constitutional order is not simply a legal artifice that is imposed
on the chaos of politics, but is also an emergent architecture that oper-
ates within and through politics itself.
205. See, e.g., id.
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